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Articles
Municipal Low-Income Housing Controls:
An Intrusive Special Interest
Abuse of Police Powers

PETER E. MILLSPAUGH*

The goal of a decent home and suitable living environment for every
American family' remains to be realized for a substantial segment
of households in the United States today. For decades, resources and
incentives emanating from the public and private sectors alike, have
been devoted to achieving this goal. The effort continues to fall short.
Over one-third of households in the United States are presently
sheltered by rental housing. 2 At the same time, the stock of rental
housing in many areas of the country is deteriorating and suffering
depletion. 3 The costs for both owners and users of rental housing
are on the rise. Experiencing the brunt of these shortages and rising
* Associate Professor of Business Legal Studies, George Mason University. B.S. United
States Military Academy; M.A. Georgetown University; J.D. American University. Admitted
to Practice, Commonwealth of Virginia.
1. Housing Act of 1949, §2, 42 U.S.C. §1441 (1964 & Supp. V. 1970).
2. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING, 89 (1982).
3. M. LEA, RENTAL HOUSING: CONDITION AND OUTLOOK (U.S. Government Printing Office,
1981). This and the subsequent general observations concerning rental housing in recent years
run through much of the primary literature on the subject. E.g., G. STERNLIEB AND J. HUGHES,
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costs, the renter-user is responding by pressuring local governments
to impose controls on the private sector owners and operators of rental
housing. In some instances, the governmental response has been
dramatic. In the two years between 1979 and 1981 alone, for example, municipalities comprising over one-half the population of
California enacted some form of rent control.' Rent controls have
now been enacted in over 200 cities nationwide, affecting a substantial portion of the multi-family rental housing stock of the nation.'
By contrast, in numerous other local jurisdictions rent control initiatives
have been rejected by either city or town councils, or by the voters. 6
The term "rent control" has become a modern day idiom which
often encompasses governmental controls other than those directed
solely at rents. With increasing frequency, rent control regimes have
come to include the regulation of tenant eviction and the removal
of rental units from the market.7 The underlying public policy justifications commonly cited for rent control initiatives are: (1) to assure
that the price of rental housing is commensurate with the financial
means of low and moderate income users, and (2) to preserve the
existing rental units against the forces of redevelopment, condominium
conversion, and demolition. Noble goals, in and of themselves,
however, cannot insure the workability and effectiveness of the devices
adopted to achieve them. Increasing evidence indicates that in the
American context, measures enacted in the name of rent control have
been, and continue to be, prohibitively costly and often
counter-productive.
AMERICA'S HOUSING: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS (1980); B. Frieden, et. at, THE NATION'S HousING: 1975 TO 1985 (1977); T. HAZLETT, RESOLVING THE HOUSING CRISIS: GOVERNMENT POLICY,
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST; A. DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980S (1983);
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, RENTAL HOUSING: A NATIONAL PROBLEM THAT
NEEDS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION, Rept. to Cong. CED-80-11 (General Accounting Office, 1979);
DECONTROL,

THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING (1982).

4. NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL, THE SPREAD OF RENT CONTOL, 1-17 (1982).
5. T. THIBODEAU, RENT REGULATION AND THE MARKET FOR RENTAL HOUSING SERVICES
9 (1981).
6. The National Multi Housing Council has tracked the fate of rent control initiatives
state by state in recent years. See National Multi Housing Council, Comments Regarding Rent
Control, 17-22 (1982) (unpublished).
7. The rent control measure adopted by the City of Santa Monica, California, provides
an illustration of combining these types of controls. See infra notes 19-77 and accompanying text.
8. See generally RENT CONTROL-MYTHS AND REALITIES (V. Block and E. Elsen eds. 1981);
P. SALINS, THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN THE HOUSING MARKET (1980); T. SoWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS (1980); F. HAYEK,
el. al., Rent Control: A PopularParadox (1975); M. LETr, RENT CONTROL: CONCEPTS, REALITIES,
AND MECHANISMS (1976); T. HAZLETT, supra note 3, (chapter 10, 11); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2. For literature in support of low-income housing controls,
see generally J. GIIDERBLOOM, RENT CONTROL: A SOURCE BOOK (1981); R. STUMBERO AND E.
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In certain instances in the past, rent controls have been effective
and justified. Nationwide controls to counteract the impact of large

numbers of returning servicemen following World War II, and con-

trols in Alaskan cities to offset the influx of pipeline workers can

be singled out in this regard. 9 In stark contrast to modern rent control measures, however, these earlier controls were narrow, temporary,

short term measures, which were promptly removed when the
emergency or special circumstances that called them into being had
passed. Archetypical of the contemporary acceptability of permanent

controls is the infamous rent control system of New York City imposed under temporary emergency legislation in 1943."0 The controls

continue to this day.
The indictment against present day rent control regimes includes

multiple counts." Evidence clearly indicates that rent controls, even
the prospect of impending controls, can become a severe disincentive
to capital investment and new construction in housing. To those
developing or financing the construction or rehabilitation of rental
stock, the strictures which accompany rent controls are often chilling

disincentives. Increases to the rental stock as well as the preservation

2
of existing stock is thereby impeded or terminated.' Controls which
prohibit a minimum market rate of return on investment coupled with
the ever rising costs of facility upkeep cause owners to disinvest through
3
reduced maintenance, conversion and/or abandonment. In most
instances, controls have been shown to drive down the value of controlled units. Beyond this reduction in the value, the local tax base
often experiences a decline, shifting the increased burden to the owners
of residential and other types of property.' While aggravating the
WEINER, THE NEED FOR RENT CONTROL (1974). For a recent survey of rent control literature,
see NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING COuNcI., AN ANNOTATED BILIOGRAPHY OF RENT CONTROL

MATERIALS (1979, & rev. 1982).
9.

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 92.

10. Id.
11. The brief summary critique which follows is selective rather than comprehensive.
Likewise, the supporting references are merely representative of a larger literature in many
instances. Cf. Shenkel, Rent Control: A Critical Review, 39 J. PROP. MOT. 101 (1974).
12. Davidson, The Impact of Rent Control on Apartment Investment, 46 APPRAISAL JOURNAL
570 (1978); Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 JOURNAL OF POLrricAL ECONOMYv
1081 (1972); Serruya & Chan, Effects of Rent Control on the Decision to Invest in Residential
Construction: Some Empirical Evidence, APPRAISAL INSTITUTE MAGAZINE, (July 1977).
13. Durst, If the Cities Go Down, So Goes The Nation: An Urban Analysis and a Prescription for Housing Revival, 11 J. oF THE INST. FOR SOCbOECONOMIC STUDmS, 25 (1977); The
New Landlords, REALTOR, (Nov. 1980); Comment, The Condominium Conversion Problem:
Causes and Solutions, 80 DUKE L.J., 306 (1980).
14. Note, The District of Columbia Rental Housing Act of 1977: The Effect of Rent Control on the Real Estate Housing Market, 27 CATH. U.L. REv., 607 (1978); Sternlief & Hughes,
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shortage and subsidizing the price, controls increase the demand for
governmentally regulated units. This in turn reduces user mobility,
from which an array of undesireable side effects can emanate. One
such effect, for example, can be the solidification of the existing de
facto socioeconomic and racial segregation prevalent in many lowincome urban and rural communities."s Longstanding rent control
jurisdictions become vulnerable to the forces of an underground
market, favoritism and nepotism, which combine to gradually shift
the beneficial use of controlled units to middle and upper income
occupants.' 6 And finally, the growing social and economic costs to
the public and private sector which attend rent control present an
17
increasing concern.
Under the weight of these problems and their supporting evidence,
the facially appealing institution of rent control is being subjected
to increased scrutiny. Undaunted, however, by mounting evidence that
in fact such controls do not increase the quality of low-income housing in a community, proponents of rent control continue to find and
exploit local conditions where controls can be marketed. A peculiar
combination of moral righteousness and self-interest may be the
Achilles' heal of the rent control movement however, as its agenda
becomes more aggressive and consequently more provocative with
time. I8

Utilizing the recent experience of the City of Santa Monica, California, this article will explore the genesis and anatomy of a state-ofthe-art American rent control measure. The four realms into which
the controls intrude most deeply, and the nature of this intrusion,
will then be addressed. Against this background, the Constitutional
analysis which presently shields local rent control measures from
judicial intervention will be examined. In conclusion, some observations concerning developments associated with the escalating
controversy over rent controls will be offered.
Rent Controls Impact on the Community Tax Base, J. PROP. MGT., (1980); K. Harney, The
Invisible Tax: What Home Owners Pay To Support Local Rent Controls (1982) (unpublished).
15. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Urban Legal Foundation, Inc., 12-14, Nash v. City of
Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
16. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Urban Legal Foundation, Inc. at 14. See generally, A.
LINDBECK, THE POLITCAL EcONOMY OF THE NEw LEFr: AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW (1971).
17. Keen and Raiff, Rent Controls: Panacea,Placebo, or Problem Child?, BusINEss REVIEW
(Jan. 1974); Kriesfeld, The Cost of Meeting Rent Control Requirements, 44 J. PROP. MaT.
68 (1975); Olsen, supra note 12.
18. See infra notes 19-77 and accompanying text (analysis of the recently adopted rent
control law by the City of Santa Monica, California).
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THE SANTA MONICA EXAMPLE: TiiE GENESIS AND
ANATOMY OF CONTROLS

The experience of the city of Santa Monica, California in adopting
rent controls in the spring of 1979 provides an excellent illustration
of the origins, psychology, politics, and statutory content of modern
rent controls. The Santa Monica experience suggests some explanations for the paradox between the continuing appeal of rent control
against its record of failure. A notable legal challenge to the Santa
Monica controls serves as a vehicle to address the central legal issues
as well as the broader dimensions of the rent control controversy.
The political appeal of rent control is in part attributable to the
enduring public perception of the heartless, exploitative landlord versus
the helpless, powerless tenant. Rent controls, with provisions that shift
power, value, and property interests to the tenant can also be made
to appear to be aimed at reforming centuries of injustice and inequality. The emotions engendered by this ancient orientation can yield
the political high-ground and momentum sufficient for the legislative
enactment of rent controls.19 For example, the preamble to the Santa
Monica rent control law unreservedly positions among its central concerns the alleged "exploitation" and "speculation" by landlords.2
Other factors related to the political success of installing rent controls are also discernable from the Santa Monica example.
Demographics of the jurisdiction, for example, indicate a larger population of tenants than homeowners. 2 ' Although tenant majorities do
not correlate with rent controls in every instance, controls are seldom
found elsewhere. 2 The impact of special interest group activity on
the political process at the local level often is evident in struggles
over the enactment of rent control. Real estate and business interests
opposed to controls become hard pressed to counter the political clout
of a tenant majority acting in its perceived self-interest. This same
majority often is allied with social activist groups from churches,
19. See T. HAZLETr, supra note 3 at 277-78. For some data and analysis on the politics
of rent control, see S.J. DEcANio, RENT CONTROL VOTING PATTERNS, POPULAR VIEWS, AND
GROUP INTERESTS; T. HAZLETT, supra note 3 at 301-313.
20. Santa Monica City Charter, Art. XVIII, §1800 (Statement 6f Purpose, at 1).
21. The City of Santa Monica renters make up nearly 80 percent of the population. Granelli,
Santa Monica: Anti-Business?, Tim NAT'L L.J. Nov. 29, 1982.
22. National Multi Housing Council, supra note 6, at 17, 19. Interestingly, the common
presumption that special interest laws are representative of a minority interest would not pertain in the case of rent control laws in jurisdictions where tenants outnumber homeowners.
Indeed, most rent control laws are examples of the theoretical dilemma of the potential tyranny
of the majority in systems of representative government.
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poverty and welfare action agencies, and legal aid programs. Not surprisingly, the Santa Monica rent control law was initially drafted by
a legal aid attorney active in the campaign to enact rent controls.23
A.

Background and Adoption

In the late 1970's, the scarcity and increasing costs of rental housing converged with an alliance of political activist groups to set in
motion a campaign to institute rent control laws in the City of Santa
Monica. Landowners and proprietors of rental housing in the city
moved to protect themselves when the proponents of controls rapidly
secured a rent control referendum in 1978. This initiative fell short
of passage by only a slight margin. Conversion and demolition of
the low-income rental stock in the city began to increase. As
beneficiaries of a self-fulfilling prophecy, the rent control forces then
were able to point with alarm to what they characterized as a "demolition derby." 2 In April of the following year, the voters, nearly eighty
percent of whom were renters, approved a comprehensive rent control amendment to the City Charter.25
With victory secure, the zeal of rent control movement was translated
into an expansive, aggressive and controversial bureacracy of regulators.
Within three years, the budget of the newly created Rent Control Board
was more than seven and a half times greater than that estimated
when the law was being advocated.26 A per unit fee increase from
$12.50 to $72.00 levied on the City's landlords became necessary in
order to support a threefold increase in staff and a $2.3 million annual
budget. 27 The terms of the Santa Monica law and their implementation have engendered a notable legal reaction as well. To informatively
examine the legal issues currently surrounding rent control measures,
some familiarity with the design and thrust of the Santa Monica
measure is necessary.
23.

Subsequently appointed to the position of City Attorney for Santa Monica. See Granelli,

supra note 21.
24. The city claimed that some 1,294 units (.2%V0
of the total) were demolished and hundreds of others converted to condominiums during the fifteen months prior to the enactment

of controls. See CITY

OF SANTA MONICA, HOUSING ELEMENT TECHNICAL REPORT,

54, 142 (Jan.

1981).

25.

Santa Monica City Charter, Art. XVIII (1979).

26. Curtius, Rent Board Costs DwarfPredictions, Santa Monica California Outlook, June
20, 1981, 1, col. 4.

27.

With rent controls, the annual increase in rents reportedly dropped during this period

from 7 percent in 1979 to 5.5 percent in 1981. National Multi Housing Council, supra note
4, at 14.
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B.

The Substance of Modern Controls

The electorate of Santa Monica adopted rent controls on April 10,
1979 as an amendment to the City Charter.2 8 The city readopted a
slightly revised version on November 6, 1984.29 As with most rent
control measures in recent years, the perception and characterization
of the problem flawed the design and thrust of the Santa Monica
law from its inception. Although the rent control law cites as the
central underlying problem a growing shortage of housing units, the
statute directs itself almost exclusively to the effects of the shortagerising rents and the impact of high rents on the renter population
of the city. Reflecting the visceral distrust of the institution of private
property and the efficiency of free markets which lies just below the
surface of modern rent control measures, the statute assigns the
immediate cause of the troublesome rent increases to exploitation and
speculation by unnamed landlords and landowners. The statute concludes that these alleged practices sufficiently endanger the health and
welfare of Santa Monica tenants to invoke the police power of the
city.3" Thus, the force and effect of the controls are directed toward
the symptoms rather than the underlying illness the City was facing. 3I
Typical of contemporary rent control regimes, the Santa Monica
law creates a permanent government regulatory agency charged with
implementing the provisions and intent of the statute. 32 This agency,
known as the Rent Control Board, is given budget authority through
a public hearing process, discretionary authority to hire temporary
or permanent staff,33 and is headed by five Commissioners elected
for four-year staggered terms.3" In addition to possessing general
28. Santa Monica City Charter Art. XVIII, §§1800-1812.
29. The revisions were relatively few and left the substance of the ordinance intact. The
object of substantial litigation in the interim, the law now states that the intent of the 1984
revision is "to clarify the law and ensure that the Rent Control Board possesses adequate
independent authority to carry out its duties . . . , to ensure due process of law for landlords
and tenants, effective remedies for violation of the law . . . , consistency with constitutional
requirements . . . , to enable the Board to provide relief to persons facing particular hardship
and to protect and increase the supply of affordable housing in the City." Id. §1800.
30. Id.
31. Id. It should be noted that the Santa Monica statute also contains a decontrol provision which places authority with the Rent Control Board to decontrol "[i]f the average annual
vacancy rate in any category, classification, or area of controlled rental units exceeds five (5)
percent . . ." and other conditions are met under §1803(r). Id. §1803(r). New construction
also can be exempt from controls at the Board's discretion under §1801(c)(5). Id. §1801(c)(5).
These features arguably reflect some statutory concern for increasing the stock of the scarce
housing.
32. Santa Monica City Charter Art. XVIII, §1803.
33. Id. §1803(0(6).
34. Id. §1803(d), (e).
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rulemaking powers to carry out the intent of the law,"1 the Board
is assigned fifteen enumerated instances in which implementation of
the various provisions of the statute require the Board to act.36
The provisions requiring Board implementation are so overreaching
in relation to the statute's objectives that they cut an unnecessarily
wide swath through existing law and practice. In addition to regulating
rent levels, the Santa Monica law incorporates controls over the
termination of tenancies and the removal of units from the market.
The termination of tenancies is prohibited except for enumerated "good
cause" reasons. 37 Statutory protection is extended specifically to concerted action by tenants in organizing against a landlord,3" and certain procedural safeguards are added for the tenant suffering a lawful
39
eviction.
The first item addressed by the rent control provisions of the original
Santa Monica law was to freeze rents at their existing levels for 120
days4" and then roll them back to previous year levels. 4 ' This then
became the statutory base level for determining future annual rent
adjustments by the Board.42
Under the statutory rent regulation scheme, the Rent Control Board,
the tenant, and the public become parties to ongoing rent-setting decisions. 3 General or annual rent adjustments, either upward on behalf
of the landlord or downward on behalf of the tenant, are tied to
a prescribed public hearing process and specified statutory standards.44
The statute calls for a formal hearing of record initiated by written
petition. This petition must be supported by prescribed documented
evidence, and conducted by an appointed hearing examiner upon
proper notice to the parties. Rent adjustment decisions must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and may be appealed first
to the Board, and then to the appropriate court within the
35.
36.

Id. §1803(g).
For example, setting rent ceilings, setting and collecting the annual per-unit registra-

tion fee, conducting studies, surveys, investigations and hearings, etc. Id. §1803(f)(l)-(15).
37. Id. §1806(a)-(h). This section includes those causes commonly encountered by the landlord
such as nonpayment of rent, creating a nuisance, and use of the premises for illegal purposes. Id.
38. Id. §1806(i).
39. Id. The landlord must state the cause for termination and allege and prove compliance
with the Act. Id.
40. Id. §1804(a).
41. Id. §1804(b).
42. Id. §1805(a).
43. The statute also gives the Rent Control Board the authority to regulate the amount
and use of security deposits. Id. §1803(s).

44.

See id. §1805 (description of process). Specific adjustments for changes as to the costs

of utilities, taxes, or maintenance are recognized by the statute. Id. §1805(b).
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jurisdiction." Preconditions placed on the landlord for use of this
process in seeking a rent adjustment include compliance with all provisions of the rent control statute, the regulations and directives issued
by the Rent Control Board, and any applicable state or local housing
health or safety codes." No equivalent preconditions are required of
the tenant.
Violations of the controls are met by provisions for both civil and
criminal remedies, and apply only to the landlord. The criminal remedy
is prosecution for a misdemeanor. Conviction carries the punishment
of a fine of up to five hundred dollars and/or imprisonment for up
to six months. 7
In any rent control scheme, the most serious and direct violation
would be the act of receiving rents in excess of the ceiling imposed
by law. The Santa Monica statute provides for civil actions by the
Rent Control Board as well as the tenant in such instances.
Preliminarily, the tenant may file either a civil action in the courts
or an administrative complaint to the Board. Alternatively, the Board
is authorized to file an action on behalf of the tenant. For the landlord
that acts "willfully or with oppression, fraud or malice," treble
damages are called for."
Just beneath the surface of modern rent control regimes lies a
smoldering outrage at the perceived injustice the tenant is suffering
at the hands of the landlord. This social indignity seems to fuel the
reformist impulse which in turn burdens most statutes with basic structural infirmities not normally associated with a legislative product.
The Santa Monica law, for example, is devoid of any semblance of
restraint or evenhandedness. The statutory provisions, without exception, assign obligations, duties, procedural burdens and sanctions solely
to the landlord. The tenant is essentially a passive, duty-free beneficiary
of an array of newly created statutory rights and benefits. These
features, as well as their intrusive nature and legal impact, which are
common to rent control measures, were brought to light through a
legal challenge mounted against the Santa Monica law shortly after
enactment.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. §1808.
Id. §1805(h)(1) and (2).
Id. §1810.
Id. §1809.
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C. A Legal Challenge

The implementation of the Santa Monica rent control law has
generated considerable legal resistance. 9 The challenge which
engendered the most comprehensive judicial examination of the statute
and the major issues of law raised by it was filed in late 1979. The
litigation worked its way through the appeals court to the Supreme
Court of California for decision some four years later.
Jerome K. Nash, owner of a six-unit apartment building in Santa
Monica, became disillusioned with his tenants and the demands of
landlording. In December of 1979 he applied to the Rent Control Board
for a removal permit under the provisions of the new rent control
law.50 His intention was to incur the additional cost of razing his
building and retain the real property, hoping that at some future time
it might be sold at a price whereby some of the lost value could be
recouped. The primary purpose of this decision, however, was to divest
himself of the risks, obligations, and demands that accompany the
enterprise of landlording in the interim. The Board rejected the Nash
petition on the technical grounds that the lack of a "fair return"
was a necessary preliminary finding, and that Nash would therefore
be required to first petition the Board for a rent increase.-" Having
no interest in remaining in the business of landlording, and therefore
no interest in raising rents, Nash petitioned the Superior Court of
the County of Los Angeles for a Writ of Mandate which would require
the Rent Control Board to issue him a removal permit.52
The statutory provision that most directly entangled Nash required
that a number of conditions be satisfied before a removal permit could
be issued. Attendant to the granting of a permit, the statute requires
the Rent Control Board to make the following findings: (1) that the
unit is not presently occupied by a low to moderate income tenant,
(2) that the rent charged for the unit is not affordable by a lowincome family or person, (3) removal of the unit would not adversly
affect the supply of housing, and (4) that the landlord cannot make
a fair return on investment.53
49. See infra notes 76-120, and accompanying text.
50. Santa Monica City Charter Art. XVIII, §1803(t).
51. Id.
52. Nash v. City of Santa Monica, et. aL, No. C-311502, slip op. (Superior Court, County
of L.A., Cal., June 20, 1980).
53. Santa Monica City Charter, Chapt. XVIII, §1803(t) . . . . the Board is required to
make each of the following findings: (1)That the controlled rental unit is not occupied by
a person or family of very low income, low income, or moderate income. (2) That the rent
of the controlled rental unit is not at a level affordable by a person or family of very low
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The Nash petition also faced Rent Control Board procedures and
regulations that required a Category 1 permit. To qualify, the applicant must establish that the rent based upon family size exceed thirty
percent of moderate income, and that the income of all tenants exceeds
moderate income. Both measurements are to be made by the Board
annually. Additionally, since the Board must find that the landlord

cannot make a fair return on his investment by retaining the unit,
the applicant must file a request for a rent increase concurrently with
the petition for a removal permit. 4
In support of his claim, Nash argued that the effect of this double
layer of preconditions and their unachievability as a practical matter,
was to make the statutory right to a permit illusory. Denial of a permit
to remove his units, Nash argued further, constituted a denial of his
basic right to go out of business in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
In defense, the City and the Rent Control Board argued that the
statute generally, and those provisions in question, specifically, were
in furtherance of stated California housing policy." The city and Board
asserted further that the provisions in question were proper local
government concerns, which placed them within the purview of the
income, low income, or moderate income. (3) That the removal of the controlled rental unit
will not adversely affect the supply of housing in the City of Santa Monica. (4) That the landlord
cannot make a fair return on investment by retaining the controlled rental unit. Id. Requirements
(1) through (3) were omitted in the 1984 revision of the law having been declared unconstitutional as overly restrictive. See Baker v. City of Santa Monica, No. WEC 958763 (Superior
Court, County of L.A., Cal., July 27, 1983).
54. Santa Monica Rent Conrol Board Regulations, Chapt. 5, §5014. Standards for Category
I Permits:
(a) A Category I removal permit will only be granted if the rent based upon family
size exceeds 30% of moderate income as determined by the Board on an annual
basis. (b) A Category 1 removal permit will only be granted if the income of all
tenants exceeds moderate income as determined by the Board on an annual basis.
(c) If determining whether or not the granting of a Category 1 removal permit will
adversely affect the supply of housing in the city of Santa Monica, the board shall
consider all relevant factors, including the city-wide vacancy rate, the cumulative impact of removal, and whether or not the proposed development offers housing op'portunities for existing tenants of the rental units to be removed. (d) Since one of
the required findings for a Category 1 removal permit is that the landlord cannot
make a fair return on investment by retaining the controlled rental unit, the landlord
will be required to file concurrently with its application under this Chapter an
application for an individual rent adjustment under Section 1805 of the Santa Monica
City Charter and Chapter 4 of these regulations. The Board will consider the application
for an individual rent adjustment. As an alternative to granting a removal permit,
the Board may adjust the rent level so that the landlord may make a fair return
on investment by retaining the controlled rental unit.
Id.
55. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§65302, 65580(c) (requiring municipalities to plan for and conserve
affordable low and moderate income housing).
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police powers of the city. The city also argued that the statute should
be viewed as a land use regulation for purposes of constitutional
analysis. Such statutes need only evidence some nexus between the
objectives of the regulation and a legitimate governmental purpose
to satisfy state and federal constitutional standards of minimum
scrutiny.56
Although a number of other issues and theories emerged later on
appeal, at this stage the county Superior Court addressed only the
merits of Nash's immediate claim that he was in effect, denied the
right to terminate his business and raze the building. In a judgment
for Nash, the court found the claimant unable to meet any of the
statutory or Rent Control Board preconditions which together would
entitle him to a permit. 7 Left with "no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law . . . ," the court issued a
Peremptory Writ of Mandate commanding the Board to issue Nash
a removal permit.
The supporting rationale of the Superior Court is obscured somewhat
by the abbreviated conclusions of law accompanying the decision. The
court apparently considered that a property interest was ultimately
at stake, and that the city rent control law effected a taking, thus
requiring both due process and just compensation. In the words of
the court, the refusal of the Rent Control board to issue the permit
"violates the interdiction against the deprivation of property without
due process of law contained in the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution. . . . -5 Likewise, the refusal "violates the interdiction
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation contained in . . . the fifth amendment to the Constitution.
"6o The case was promptly appealed to the California Court of
Appeal where the case was accepted and argued in early 1983.61
56. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
57. Nash, No. C-311502, slip op. at 5-6 (Superior Court, County of L.A., Cal., June
20, 1980).

58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. CAL. CoNsT. art I, §71(a) is also cited by the court as authority for its conclusion. Id.

60. Id. Also cited as authority for the conclusion is CAL. CONST. art I, §19. Id. at 7.
The court proffered a third ground for its decision which was expressed in the following terms:
"Petitioner is constitutionally entitled not to be compelled to sell the building as the only means
of terminating his business and removing himself and his property from under the Board's
regulator jurisdiction." Id.
61. Subsequent to the Superior Court decision, the litigation began to attract attention.
Participating as Amicus Curiae at various stages were Pacific Legal Foundation, the Terminal
Plaza Corporation, the National Trust For Historic Preservation, Californians For Preservation Action, and Listed Preservation Groups and Individuals.
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Upon initial consideration, the California Court of Appeal became
interested in a strict scrutiny standard of review in light of the burden
placed by the Santa Monica rent control law upon the personal
liberty interests of Nash. The court requested supplemental briefs on
the issue following oral argument, and subsequently grounded the
affirmation of the decision below largely on the nature of the liberty
rights of the landlord which the statute placed at risk.62 In defining
its judicial task, the court stated it must ". . . determine the nature
of the rights involved . . . and the appropriate standard of review. "63
Although affirming the judgment of the lower court, the Court of
Appeal employed a different line of analysis. 6" Examining the impact
of the Santa Monica law on the Nash situation, the Court of Appeal
agreed with the trial court that a right to go out of business was
at issue. The court reasoned that the close relationship between this
right and other personal rights that are deemed fundamental, requires
that a heightened scrutiny be employed in evaluating any infringement by the rent control law. 65 The California strict scrutiny standard requires that the law in question be justified by a "compelling
state interest," and "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake. ' 66 Upon application of this standard, the court
concluded that the Santa Monica law was overly broad and not sufficiently justified by such a compelling state interest so as to override
the burden the statute placed upon the personal freedoms of Nash
as a landlord.67
The California Supreme Court, upon appeal, brought yet another
orientation and perspective to Nash's claim.66 Under the statute, the
majority of the court was unwilling to find that Nash was denied
the right to go out of business, primarily because the court felt that
Nash retained other options through which he could realize the right.69
Even if such a right could be established, the skeptical majority
62. Nash, 143 Cal. App. 3d 251, 191 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1983).
63. Id. at 253, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
64. As Justice Grodin, writing for the majority, observed wryly when the case reached
the California Supreme Court, "As is so often the case in constitutional litigation, the issues
appear different depending upon one's perspective." Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 99, 207 Cal. Rptr.
285, 287, 688 P.2d 894, 896 (1984).
65. Nash, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 253, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 721 (1983).
66. Perez v. City of San Bruno, 27 Cal. 3d 875, 889, 168 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122, 616 P.2d
1287, 1295 (1980).
67. Nash, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 254, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 722 (1983).
68. Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
69. The most apparent and often cited is the option to sell the business and the property,
assuming a buyer could be found. Id. at 103-104, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 289-290, 688 P.2d at 898-99.
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reasoned, further, the infringement by the law merely was indirect
and minimal.7"
By discounting the proposition that the Santa Monica law posed
a significant threat to landlord freedoms, the majority placed the statute
in a position of sanctuary. In the absence of any fundamental
individual complication, the statute could be treated as a routine land
use law for purposes of judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the majority
ruled that the statute was reasonably related to a proper government
purpose and therefore met the requisite minimum test.7 The rent
control law provisions in question were declared constitutional and
the decision in the lower courts reversed."
Chief Justice Bird, agreeing with the result reached by her colleagues
in the majority, dissented as to the legal analysis employed. Justice
Bird felt that Nash's right to go out of the landlord business was
constitutionally protected, and that this right might have been impermissibly burdened." Under these circumstances, she argued, the court
was obligated to apply the strict scrutiny test to the Santa Monica
law. The Justice noted, however, that she had no difficulty in finding that the Santa Monica law met the strict scrutiny test. Although
Nash's right had been burdened, she argued, "it is not an unduly
harsh one in view of the city's compelling interest in providing hous'7
ing for its residents."
In vigorous dissent, Justice Mosk also distanced himself from the
majority. 75 Like Chief Justice Bird and the courts below, Justice Mosk
saw the issue as the bar imposed by the Rent Control law to Nash's
exit from the landlord business. The right to go out of business, he
argued, is absolute in the sense that one willing to sacrify the past,
present and future interest in his enterprise in order to discontinue

70. Id. at 103-104, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 289-290, 688 P.2d at 898-99.
71. Under both the California and federal constitutions.
72. Nash, 37 Cal. 3d at 108, 207 Cal. Rptr., at 293-94, 688 P.2d at 902-03 (1984).
Although Nash's claim that he was denied the right to go out of business under the law failed
to sway the court, it did influence the California legislature. See 1985 Cal. Stat. c. 1509, at
_.
Since this writing, California has enacted a statewide prohibition against allowing such
circumstances to arise again. Id. In the words of the statute, "No public entity. . . shall by
statute ordinance, or regulation, or by administrative action . . . compel the owner of any
residential real property to offer, or continue to offer, accommodations in the property for
rent or lease." Id.
73. "If the city had fined Nash one dollar for ceasing to be a landlord, the majority
would have had no difficulty that the asserted personal liberty interest had been burdened.
Practically, the ordinance imposed a far greater burden than a small fine" Id. at 110-11, 207 Cal.
Rptf. at 294, 688 P.2d at 903 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 110, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 294, 688 P.2d at 902-03.
75. Id. at 112, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 295, 688 P.2d at 904 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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that obligation must, in the end, be allowed that choice.7 6 As additional support for his dissent, Justice Mosk adopted the views of the
unanimous Court of Appeal below as his own.77
EXPLORING THE INSTRUSIVE IMPACT

The legal challenges to local rent control measures throughout the
country have met with a certain measure of success.78 Inherent in the
process of litigating, however, are constraints in which the issues
become focused and narrow. Seldom does the opportunity present
itself in litigation to draw the broad, larger objections to the target
statute into issue, and this has yet to occur with respect to rent control regimes. The unnecessarily intrusive features inherent in most forms
of rent control remain largely obscured and untouched by the fits
and starts of piecemeal litigation. Seldom examined and articulated,
the form, content, and extent of these intrusions are now beginning
to emerge. Utilizing the Santa Monica law by example, and the Nash
litigation as a stepping-off point, four major areas of statutory intrusion will be explored.
A.

Personal Liberty Consequences

The reality of rent controls is that they do much more than merely
regulate rent levels. For the property owner, regulation of rent levels
is the capture of the rent decision which in turn, constitutes the central nervous system of the rental enterprise. The controls over removing
units from the market included in most rent control laws, likewise
take over the decision to terminate the business, the ultimate enterprise choice. Although somewhat late, the nature of rent controls as
regulators of individual enterprise and thereby individual lives, may
be gaining some recognition. In this context, the seizure of the enterprise through regulatory controls can constitute a significant intrusion into the basic rights and liberties of the private owner/operator
of the enterprise. This asserted intrusion was brought to light primarily
by the Nash litigation.
Significantly, of the three tribunals contemplating this general proposition on first impression in the Nash case, two in unanimity and
76. "[I]f the question is whether a city may compel a landlord to remain in business against
his will, and give him only the alternative of a forced sale, the answer is: not in a democratic
society." Id. at 112, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 295, 688 P.2d at 904.
77. Id.
78. National Multi Housing Council, supra note 6, at 13, 17.
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a minority on the third recognized constitutional complications. This
concern for statutory intrusion into the zone of constitutionally protected personal liberty of the low-income rental property owners
regulated by rent control triggered some formative attempts to identify and define the types of rights requiring protection.
As each tribunal addressed the proposition, a diversity of approach
and perspective became apparent. The Superior Court pointed out,
for example, that the most objectionable feature of the intrusion was
that the sale of the property was the only means of exiting from the
business." To the Court of Appeal, the right to go out of business
seemed in the nature of a personal freedom because "it touches the
individual's ability to make a choice which greatly affects his or her
lifestyle." 8 In turn, the right must fall into the category of a constitutionally protected fundamental right since the right involves "a
personal decision concerning the individuals' role in the economy [and]
protects the individual's ability to use his or her talents and resources
in the manner best suited to bring life, satisfaction, and economic
security." 8 ' The Court noted further that denial of the right to discontinue can have the corollary effect of imposing the positive duty to
continue an endeavor indefinitely. In the words of the court, "[T]here
exists an undefined yet real notion of freedom which is violated by
the idea of compelling an individual to work in a given business." 82
The Appeals Court warned that restrictions on the individual, even
though short of the traditional thirteenth amendment concept of
involuntary servitude, can still be offensive to notions of personal
liberty. s3
Justices Bird and Mosk joined in dissent from the California
Supreme Court's final ruling by noting also the changing orientation
of the duties of a modern day landlord. Since such duties now
79. Nash, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 255, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 721 (1983).
80. Id. at 253, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 719, 720.
81. Id. at 252, 191 Cal. Rptr. at at 720. The court draws an anology between the right
to stop working and the "right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community", recognized in state law. Id. at 252, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 720. Arguably, denial of the

right to stop working constitutes an intrusion of greater severity. Its denial leaves the victim

schackled with the demands of time, energy, and resources required to continue the enterprise

which would not attend a denial to enter into a particular endeavor.

82. Id. at 252, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 720. See Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionalityof Protecting TenantsFrom Condominium Conversion, 18 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.

179 (1983) (for a concept of tenant's interest, and an argument that the tenant interest

be factored into the equation in considering rental housing controls, specifically condominium

conversions).
83.

Id.
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"necessarily involve the rendering of personal services" to the tenant,
thirteenth amendment concerns for the freedom to withhold the rendering of personal services become more germane." Justice Mosk noted
further the rapid expansion of legal risks and obligations attaching
to the ownership and management of rental housing."5 To expose the
landlord to this universe of burgeoning criminal and civil liabilities
against the will of the landlord, Justice Mosk suggests, makes the
intrusive impact of the statute on the individual even more onerous.
The potential for personal intrusions inherent in the substance and
implementation of a number of provisions common to rent control
schemes is real. As the Nash predicament suggests, these intrusions
exist and can cut deeply into the freedom of individuals to order their
own lives and to employ their talents, energy and resources toward
forms of life, satisfaction, and economic security of their own choosing. As the sweep and severity of rent control intrusion into personal
liberties gain recognition, the call for constitutional protection will
experience increased credibility.
B.

Housing Market Impact

The destructive and ultimately counterproductive economic and social
effects of rent controls on a community and its housing markets over
time, is now quite predictable. On this point, one finds most
knowledgeable housing experts and economists in agreement.8 6
Economic analysis articulates best the form and extent of the intrusion of rent controls into the market on behalf of a statutorily preferred
class of housing.
Imposing legal controls on rent levels incapacitates free market functioning because the controls jam the necessary signals between the
users of the commodity and the suppliers.8 7 In fact, depressing rents
84. Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 110-14, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 294-97, 688 P.2d 894, 903-06 (1984).
85. The Justice lists examples of numerous new landlord obligations the courts have
recognized in recent years. See id. at 114, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 297, 688 P.2d at 906.
86. See generally M. LEA, supra note 3. This conclusion has been drawn by other commentators as well. See, e.g., Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has
Passed, 36 MAINE L. REv. 261 (1984); Pulliam, Brandeis Brief For Decontrol of Land Use:
A Plea for ConstitutionalReform, 13 Sw. L. REV. 435 (1983); Hirsch & Hirsch, The Changing
Landlord-Tenant Relationship in California:An Economic Analysis of the Swinging Pendulum,
14 Sw. L. REv. 27 (1983).
87. I am indebted to Thomas Hazlett for this particular analogy. See T. HAzLETr, supra
note 3, at 279-81. Rent controls are also a form of price-fixing that attempts to monopolize
the market by arbitrarily fixing and maintaining rents below the fair market value. The California
Supreme Court has rejected this antitrust challenge to the Berkeley rent control law, but the
U.S. Supreme Court has certified the case for review. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d

644 (1985).
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to below levels which normal supply and demand forces would set,
sends the wrong message to the market. The artificially lower rents
set by law signal an adequate supply of housing units in relation to

demand. By so incapacitating the pricing mechanism of the market,
rent controls deny the market the ability to respond to the actual

forces of supply and demand. Ironically, the artifically low rents
imposed by controls encourage the very scarcity of housing which

is the underlying justification for the imposition of controls in the
first instance.
By paralyzing market mechanisms, rent restrictions cause economic
injury which, in turn, can lead to debilitating side-effects. 88 These
economic-related ramifications, becoming better understood and
documented, are indigenous not only to the American experience with
controls, but have appeared in other countries as well.89 A listing
of complications traceable to market disruption in this context has
been attempted," but some attention to the most troublesome will
serve for purposes of this inquiry. Such complications comprise a segment of the evidence reflecting adversely on the efficacy of rent control as an instrument of social policy in a free-market setting.
Rent control has been shown to decrease property value which in
turn lowers the tax base leading to either a decrease in necessary public

services or a shifting of the tax burden onto other sectors."' Further
aggravating this problem is the fact that the general economic base
in rent control areas often stagnates and erodes under the imposition
of controls.92 Controls also exert a chilling effect on new investment
and enterprise that could otherwise contribute to the local economy
88. Supra note 11-17 and accompanying text. The economic implications of rent controls
are explored theoretically in various articles. See, e.g., Francena, Alternate Models of Rent
Control, 12 URB. STUD. 303 (1975); Moorhouse, Optimal Housing Maintenance Under Rent
Control, 39 S. ECON. J. 93 (1972); Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J.
POL. EcoN. 1081 (1972, cited in Hirsch & Hirsch, The Changing Landlord-TenantRelationship
In California:An Economic Analysis of the Swinging Pendulum, 14 Sw. L. REV. 2, 33 at n.170
(1983)). See also A. SPoRNj, EM'IlCAL STUDIES INTi EcONOMICS OF SLUM OWNERSHIP (1960);
C. RAPKIN, Tim REAL ESTATE MARKET IN THE URBAN RENEWAL AREA (1959).
89. See J. BRENNER AND H. FRANKLIN, RENT CONTROL IN AMERICA AND FOUR EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES (Council for International Urban Liaison, Mercury Press 1977); S. HAMILTON AND
D. BAXTER, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS IN DANGER; RENT CONTROL IN CANADA (1975); European Experience With Rent Controls, 100 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 8 (1977).
90. Shenkel, supra note 11 at 101. The evidence against rent control has evoked an especially
strong response from some scholars and commentators. See, e.g., A. LINDBECK, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW LEFT (1971) ("In many cases, rent control appears to be the most
efficient technique presently known to destroy a city-except for bombing.").
91. Analysis and conclusions concerning the numerous harmful side effects can be found
throughout the literature in other fields as well. Specifically on property values and taxes, see
G. Sternlief, supra note 14.
92. See Sternlief, supra note 14.
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and the scarcity of housing through rehabilitation and new construction. An entirely predictable increase in incidents of abandonment
or conversion is the result. 93 The allocation of controlled units often
falls prey to black market and other forces in jurisdictions laboring
under rent control, impeding the access to controlled units by the
9
class of renters the controls were initially intended to benefit.
The economic and social harm is extended further under statutes
such as that in Santa Monica where demolition and eviction controls
are combined with rent restrictions. The dimensions added by removal
controls alone is illustrative. Restrictions of this nature tend to
encourage socioeconomic segregation." They also eliminate property
uses alternative to renting to the statutorily preferred economic class
of tenants and instead make, development more attractive in more
affluent, adjacent areas where demolition is in effect exempt from
the lower economic and financial criteria imposed by controls. From
another perspective, this discriminatory impact can also be criticized
as an infringement on the right of lower income communities under
rent control to attract outside investment capital to bolster their local
96
economy and rehabilitate and replenish the scarce housing stock.
Rent controls in their representative modern forms pose an anathema
to economic analysis. Evidence abounds that the economic impact
of most controls is devastating. By removing incentive and layering
restrictions on ownership and management of the desired housing,
controls chill new investment and entrepreneurship, paralyze the
market, and set off an epidemic of disinvestment. Ultimately, this
form of government regulation brings more harm than good to the
intended beneficiaries. The counterproductive intrusion rent controls
make into the economic environment of a community also weighs
heavily in the case against controls.
C. Landlord-Tenant Relationship
As do most rent control measures, the Santa Monica law also
intrudes into the relationship between the providers of housing goods
and services in the city, and the users. To gauge the nature and extent
of this intercession, some semblance of the modern standard for the
93. See supra notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text.
94. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
95. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Urban Legal Foundation, Inc., at 12, Nash v. City of
Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
96. Id. at 14.
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relationship must be established. This requires a brief update concer-

ning the rapid evolution of the landlord-tenant relationship in this
country, and a look at the present parameters of the relationship.
The major foundational shift in the landlord-tenant relationship has
been from initial property orientation of the relationship to that of
contract.97 The early notion that the residential tenant was in receipt
of an estate of land entitling him to the nearly exclusive use for the
term of the conveyence, was accompanied by the obligation to fully
maintain the premises and pay the rent.98 Modern statutory and judicial

intervention in the name of various public policy objectives has utilized
contract principles in re-ordering the relationship. When contract principles have become too burdensome in effecting periodic rearrangements, judicial and statutory fiat have been utilized. 99 Whatever

its form, change has occurred rapidly since the middle of this century.
Triggered by the federal goal of a suitable living environment for
all, as enunciated some thirty-five years ago,' 00 municipal housing codes
throughout the country shifted the fundamental burden of repair and
maintenance of rental housing to the owner-landlord.' 1 At the same
time, a stream of tenant assistance devices began to gain legal acceptance, further reshaping the landlord-tenant relationship. Represen-

tative of such devices are forms of rent withholding, 10 2 the concept
of repair and deduct, 0 3 premises receivership,"' and the warranty of
97. See generally Indritz, The Tenants' Rights Movement, I N. MEX. L. REv. 86 (1971).
98. Restatement (Second) of Torts §356 (1963), comment (a). Additionally, in the absence
of the contract concept of mutually dependent covenants, tenant's obligation to pay rent could
continue even though the premises may have become uninhabitable through no fault of the tenant.
See Restatement of Contracts §290 (1932).
99. The Santa Monica Rent Control law is a prime example. Those aspects of the relationship necessary in the contemplation of the statute to achieve its objectives are simply taken
over by its provisions. Rights and duties are assigned by mandate of law which define a large
segment of the relationship between landlord and tenant.
100. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
101. See generally Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1115 (1966).
102. Tenant given the legal right to withhold rent due and owing from the landlord in
response to serious code violations. A number of different statutory approaches exist in this
area. See Flitton, Rent Withholding: Public and Private, 2 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 181 (1966);
Simmons, Passionand Prudence: Rent Withholding Under New York's Spiegel Law, 15 BUFFALO
L. REV. 581 (1969).
103. Tenant given the right to make necessary repairs at his own expense initially and then
deduct these expenses from subsequent rent due and owing. This device, within limits, has
been adopted either by statute or case in at least twenty-one jurisdictions. W. HIRscu, A
STUDY OF THE EFFEcTs OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT ON URBAN HOUSING MARKETS,

11-13

(Prepared for H.U.D. 1975).
104. In order to correct code violations, the court is vested with the authority to appoint
a trustee to take control of the premises from the landlord and effect the necessary corrections.
See generally Rose, Receivership: A Useful Tool for Helping to Meet the Housing Needs of
Low Income People, 3 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv., 311 (1968); Comment, Receivership of Prob-
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habitability.0 5
On balance, the duties and obligations of the landlord have greatly
increased. In addition, the scope of legal liability attending the ownership and management of rental housing in the United States has been
expanded dramatically. As the law imposes liability on the landlord
for the health, welfare, physical and emotional security of the tenant,
the control laws reshape the underlying relationship further. 0 6 Against
this revisionist landlord-tenant relationship that modern law and
jurisprudence is constructing, the specific impact exerted by rent control measures can be examined.
Among the ledger of rent control intrusions, those experienced by
the landlord-tenant relationship is perhaps the most understandable.
As noted previously, rent control statutes seem to view the landlord
as the problem, with the tenant as the injured party in need of protection. From this perspective, the relationship between the two is
therefore the logical area in which to insert reform. The question then
becomes one of what aspects of the relationship the statute chooses
to manipulate.
By illustration, the Santa Monica statute concentrates on the two
terms fundamental to the relationship between the provider and the
user of residential housing: the price of the product and when the
provider is entitled to repossess. The mechanism employed to secure
regulatory dominance over these issues is straightforward.
The law sets base rent levels and institutionalizes a formal, elaborate
public process for establishing any future rent adjustments. Control
over rent decisions, traditionally an integral part of the relationship
between landlord and tenant, is removed from the parties. Tenant
participation in the rent setting process, however, is carefully protected and impliedly encouraged. Because of the peculiar vision of
the statute, participation by either landlord or tenant presumptively
is adversarial, requiring a formal petition from the party against an
existing or proposed rent level. 0 7 In addition, a landlord's petition
lem Buildings in New York City and its Potentialfor Decent Housing of the Poor, 9 CoLum.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 309 (1973).
105. Affords the tenant a breach of warranty action or defense in situations where serious
housing code violations can be established. See Note, Implied Warranty of Habitabilityin Housing
Leases, 21 DAKE L. REv. 300 (1972); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law and the Landlord-Tenant? 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 123 (1971).
106. Note, Emerging Landlord Liability: A Judicial Offering of Tenant Remedies, 37
BROOKLYN L. REV. 387 (1971). The courts have begun to extend landlord liability beyond
the tenant to third party invitees of the tenant. See Uccello v. Landenslayer, 44 Cal. App.
3d. 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975) (landlord held liable for injury to tenant's invitee bitten
by tenant's dog).
107. Santa Monica City Charter, Art. XVIII §1805(c). Presumably any latitude to bilaterally
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to secure a rent increase is laden with preconditions,' 8 investigatory
and hearing procedures,10 9 specific documentation requirements," 10 and
the ultimate burden of proof.'1 '
The provisions of law affecting a landlord's repossession decision
are no less intrusive than those directed at rent-setting. By design,
the repossession controls of the statute set up protections for the tenant
and condition the landlords' right to evict upon compliance with them.
This is accomplished by enumerating only those conditions under which
an eviction is permissible," 2 and prohibiting the use of evictions in
retaliation against tenants exercising lawful rights." 3 By confining the
right of repossession of the landlord to a list of narrow, statutorily
defined situations, the law has circumscribed the traditionally discretionary and unilateral right of the landlord. The terms and conditions attendant to the right to repossession, now defined and
enumerated by statute, essentially have placed the decision beyond
the control of the parties to fashion their own terms on the subject.
The effect is to empty the landlord-tenant relationship of yet another
central and traditional element.
The extent to which rent control provisions in combination can and
do impact on the landlord-tenant relationship, also is suggested by
the Nash predicament. When the rent, demolition and eviction controls in the Santa Monica law combined to force Nash to continue
as a rental housing proprietor, they also froze him into a statutorily
mandated landlord-tenant relationship against his will. Overreaching,
disconnected provisions in any legislative scheme invite unintended,
complicating results.
Landlord distrust and tenant helplessness are the primary misleading
frames of reference endemic to rent control enactments. So
characterized, an equitable and just relationship between landlord and
tenant would certainly be unlikely to result. The implication is clear
that the injustice the statute seeks to prevent is due, at least in part,
to the failure of the traditional landlord-tenant relationship.
adjust rents by mutual consent of the parties is closed out by controls. Included in the prohibition of bilateral adjustments are situations in which the tenant seeks an improvement or added
service from the landlord for which the tenant is willing to pay an additional increment in rent.
108. Santa Monica City Charter, Act. XVIII, §105(e),(h),(1),(2).
109. Id. §1805(a) and §1803(g).
110. Id. §1805(d)(4).
Ill. Id. §1805(d)(8) ("...
the preponderance of the evidence submitted at the hearing").
112. Id. §1807. Listed are common situations such as failure to pay rent, breach of lease,
causing a nuisance, and destructive or illegal use of the premises. Id.
113. Id. §1806(i).
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Understandably then, rent control measures are quick to remove those
matters of statutory concern from the discretion and mutual control
of the parties. Further, under the terms of the statute, should a Santa Monica landlord and tenant enter into an understanding in their
mutual interest that would entail a waiver by the tenant of any
statutory benefit, the accord would be automatically void." 4
The nature and extent of rent control intrusion into any relationship between landlord and tenant is predictable. Those matters between the parties that are of concern in the statute can be expected
to be removed from the relationship and regulated under prescribed
standards and/or processes. Rent control measures carry the implicit
assumption that rent levels and the other concerns they may choose
to embrace can no longer be entrusted to the principals themselves.
D. Enterprise Injury
The concept of private property in American law encompasses concern for the relationship between a person and that person's property.
The relationship tends to be defined in terms of legally recognized
rights running from the owner to the property. Characterized as property rights, these have been described by the Supreme Court as "the
group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing,
as the right to possess, use, and dispose of it.""' 5
By nature, rent controls intrude on property rights running to land
'
and improvements. Their intrusive impact, touched on above,

6

will

be examined subsequently in the context of fifth and fourteenth amendment infringements. Rent controls also intrude on an intangible form
of property: the business of operating the subject housing property
itself. In this case, the property is the enterprise itself and arguably
gives rise to a separate and distinct group of enterprise rights. These
rights, in turn, run to the owner of the enterprise, either the owneroperator, or one leasing from the owner of the realty for the purpose
of conducting a rental housing business. The peculiar impact of rent
control on this property interest will be analyzed next.
Returning to the Santa Monica statute for purposes of illustration,
the impact the law has on the enterprise reveals a sweeping new
114. Id. §1807. "Non-waiverability: Any provision, whether oral or written in or pertaining
to a rental housing agreement whereby any provision of the Article for the benefit of the tenant
is waived, shall be deemed to be against public policy and shall be void." Id.
115. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945).
116. Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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intrusive dimension. Examination of the statute has shown that the
provisions are principally focused on controlling rents, evictions, and
removals. Upon closer examination, however, the impact of the statute
is also such as to regulate the prosecution of the business." 7 In particular, the case could be made that the ownership decisions that rent
controls commandeer are so integral to the prosecution of the business
as to be, in effect, property rights, themselves, and deserving of legal
protection on that basis.
The decision to set prices lies at the center of managing any free
market enterprise, particularly the rental housing business. Among
other considerations, the rent-setting decision is necessary to maintain the status quo of the enterprise and is the key to achieving efficiency, economy, upgrading, and other forms of change. Traditionally
one of the central considerations in the allocation of resources, rentsetting is the pricing mechanism of the rental-housing industry. As
such, rent-setting is the manager's primary tool for effecting internal
controls as well as the adjustments within the business necessary to
accommodate change in the external environment.
Typically, treatment of the rent decision" 8 by rent control provisions similar to those in the Santa Monica statute is to arbitrarily
set a base rent level. Future rent adjustments are to be made against
this statutorily mandated base level. Rent decisions are moved into
the public domain and subject to a formal bureaucratic process of
filings, hearings, third party decisions, and appeals. The landlord/proprietor is relegated to the periphery and allowed a perfunctory, adversarial role in petitioning and presenting testimony during the process.
The rent decision is ultimately made by either an appointed hearing
examiner or a part-time, publicly elected Rent Control Board. The
factors that the Board can take into consideration in rent adjustments
are statute-specific, which includes a "fair return" to the proprietor.
The Board is authorized to establish a fair return formula based on
an enumerated list of factors and subject to specific statutory
limitations. '' 9
117.

This observation arguably carries some relevance to the personal liberties analysis of

the impact of local rent control statutes. See infra notes 121-202 and accompanying text. See
supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.

118.

See supra notes 16-77 and accompanying text (outlining the major devices for rent

control employed by the statute).
119. Santa Monica City Charter, Art. XVIII, §1805(e). In making individual and
general adjustments of the rent ceiling, the Board shall consider the purposes of this
Article and the requirements of law. The Board may adopt as its fair return standard

any lawful formula, including but not limited to one based on investment or net
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This rent-setting regimen along with other features of the law combine to effect an irreparable intrusion into the prosecution of the enterprise. From the perspective of the proprietor, the impact of the statute
can take a number of forms. The time, energy, and costs associated
with simply pricing the product become exhorbitant. With the loss
of control over pricing, the enterprise loses a concomitant measure
of control over its present mode of operation and future direction.
Additionally, rent control regimes regulate business profits. Even
more disconcerting is the frequently utilized statutory mechanism which,
by assigning the profit decision to a board of elected regulators, in
effect turns the profit decision over to the public through its representatives, a majority of whom can be expected to be renters in most
rent control jurisdictions.' ° In addition, as the data necessary to rent
and fair return decisions is gathered and examined in the required
public forum, the inner workings of a once private enterprise become
a matter of public record.
Beyond the contemplation or concern of the statute is the fact that
the landlord and tenant also share a commercial relationship in that
the tenant is a consumer of the product and services provided by
the proprietor's enterprise. By addressing such matters as the cost
and quality of the product and the right of the user to be heard,
however, some of the concerns of rent control statutes coincide closely
with those of the tenant as a consumer of housing goods and services.
To a large extent, rent control measures can be viewed as consumer
protection laws for the tenant.
Furthermore, by design and impact, rent control measures lock the
enterprise into the mode of operation and market best suited to serve
operating income. The Board shall consider all factors relevant to the formula it
employs; such factors may include: increases or decreases in operating and maintenance
expenses, the extent of utilities paid by the landlord, necessary and reasonable capital
improvement of the controlled rental unit as distinguished from normal repair, replacement and maintenance, increases or decreases in living space, furniture, furnishing,
equipment, or services, substantial deterioration of the controlled rental unit other
than as a result of ordinary wear and tear, failure on the part of the landlord to
provide adequate housing services or to comply substantially with applicable housing, health and safety codes, federal and state income tax benefits, the speculative
nature of the investment, whether or not the property was acquired or is held as
a long term or short term investment, the landlord's rate of return on investment,
the landlord's current and base date Net Operating Income, and any other factor
deemed relevant by the Board in providing the landlord a fair return.
Id.
120. A provision for some landlord representation on the Rent Control Board is absent
from the Santa Monica statute. Representation such as this is a common feature of regulatory
bodies in other areas and serves to insure a certain degree of evenhandedness in implementing
the law.
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that class of users selected by statute. This quickly becomes apparent,
for example, in contemplating the regulatory obstacle course that would
face the controlled enterprise desiring to upgrade its housing units
and services in order to serve a higher income market. Any
downgrading of the housing enterprise under rent controls is likewise
precluded. Such a course of action would trigger code violations and
tenant complaints invoking statutory sanctions.
The totality of the impact of rent controls on the enterprise providing the housing facilities and services is clear. Enterpreneurial
incentive is removed while at the same time a number of disincentives are imposed. The contradiction of coupling a minimally acceptable return with a quantum leap in operational risks and burdens
is imposed on the enterprise. The target market is monopolized while
rates, expenses and capital investment are regulated in the interest
of the consumer. The conclusion is irrefutable. Rent control effects
a nonvolitional transformation from private enterprise to public utility. By capturing the market and removing profit potential, the entrepreneurial engine is disengaged. The result is a public enterprise,
publically regulated, which remains private in name only.
TIE CHALLENGE

To CONSTITUTIONAL SANCTUARY: SPECIFIC ISSUES
AND GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

Opposition to rent control in the courts takes the form of a struggle
over the constitutional analysis appropriate for scrutinizing this type
of local governmental intervention.' " ' More specifically, this opposition
represents an attempt to defeat the doctrinal assumptions that have
protected such local initiatives from meaningful judicial scrutiny for
over half a century. This effort entails the introduction of some new
perspectives and novel issues to encourage a reconsideration of some
variants of recent jurisprudence.
Through the continuous efforts of the Nash and other contemporary
challenges, the areas of constitutional turf representing the greatest
threat to local rent control measures are becoming apparent.' 2
Elements of the fifth and fourteenth in combination with the thirteenth amendments raise a myriad of questions in relation to the
121. Excluding those isolated cases that have challenged on the basis that rent controls contravene a national policy measure such as anti-trust protections. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
122. Federal constitutional analysis is the focus of this article. State constitutional considerations will be noted only when inseparable from, or illustrative of, a particular federal principle.
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substance and impact of such enactments. The constitutional theory
and perspective central to the Nash case is illustrative.
A.

Substantive Due Process

By claiming that the Santa Monica law in effect denied him the
right to go out of the rental housing business, Nash was able to
introduce the prospect that such laws may present a threat to the
fourteenth amendment due process rights of the landlord. The courts
were invited to consider the proposition that the statute impermissibly
infringes on fundamental liberties of proprietors in contrast to the
more common allegation that such laws merely infringe on a protected property right.
A panoply of federal Supreme Court precedent was spread before
the judiciary in support of this line of inquiry.123 As to the broad
outline of the limitations on the exercise of police powers, the Supreme
Court requires a showing "first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals." 12 1 The first standard is arguably satisfied in the case
of rent control statutes since ironically the particular class benefited
usually makes up a majority of the 'public' in rent control jurisdictions. A showing that the modem generation of controls are reasonably
necessary or not unduly oppressive, however, becomes increasingly
problematical as their impact and general effectiveness has been drawn
into question.
Specifically, Nash argued he was denied the right to go out of
business, and that this is a fundamental freedom protected within the
25 Constitutional
"liberty" protection of the fourteenth amendment.
liberty guarantees, traceable to the Magna Carta and back through
western political thought, have been addressed in their constitutional

123. Authority and argument on this point is central to the pleadings and briefs in Nash.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation In Support of Respondent at 6-14, Nash
v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d. 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984). The substantive
due process doctrine as a protection for individual economic and property rights has been largely
shunned by the Supreme Court in the last half century. See, e.g., B. SiaoA, EcoNomic LIBERTIES AND THE CoNsTrrUTION 184-203 (1980).
124. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (Reaffirming Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
125. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, §2. In pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive any
" Id. (emphasis added).
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law ....
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context by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions over the years.
The relevence of some of the specific rights included in the evolving

constitutional definition of liberty to those denied to Nash under the
rent control statute is compelling. A landlord in the Nash predica-

ment would have difficulty in taking advantage of the Court's duly
recognized right "to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood
by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or vocation .

.. 1

"to contract, [or] to engage in any of the common occupations of
life . .

-."" Indeed, the implicit Nash contention was that the right

to go out of business was inseparable from the exercise of constitutionally recognized liberty rights and thereby required protection.' 28

Judicial review of alleged statutory infringements upon individual
liberty interests requires the application of a standard of strict
scrutiny. 2 9 Strict scrutiny requires the state to establish a compelling
interest, 3 ' and the statute to employ the least restrictive means available
to achieve that interest.' 3 1 If Nash were able to establish that a fun-

damental liberty interest was at stake, he would realize a more probing judicial review of the Santa Monica law under the strict scrutiny

standard.
The resistance encountered by Nash to this challenge to rent controls is instructive.' 32 His due process claim encountered four lines

of defense. The first concerned the right to go out of business, and
whether going out of business qualified for constitutional protection.
The City argued that because Nash intended to retain the land, he
was claiming protection for an entitlement in the nature of a property

126. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
127. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
128. The notion that the liberty of due process has come to include a freedom from government restraints or a right to be left alone can also be important here. See Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, 118 (1969); L. HAND, TnE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY
144-54 (3 ed. 1960) (cited in Brief Amicus Curiae of the Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, note

122, at 11). See also L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

615 (1978), for the origins

and content of an expanded constitutional concept of the rights of privacy and personhood
upon which protections might also be extended to landlords in this context. See also, Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
129. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
131. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974).
132. The city's defense was not confined only to the merits of the challenge to the statute.
The city also argued to the court that Nash is "less concerned with vindicating some alleged
and undefined personal right than he is with circumventing Santa Monica's rent control law
in order to maximize his profits." Appellant's Petition For Hearing at 22, Nash v. City of
Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
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right which, by constitutional design, was intended to be protected
under a fifth amendment taking analysis. 3 3 Ultimately, the California
Supreme Court viewed the right claimed by Nash as a property right
by characterizing the rent control statute as imposing constitutionally
34
permissible "limitations upon the use of private property."'
In questioning the protectability of a right to go out of business,
the city argued that such a right should in no case be treated as
absolute. As evidence of methods commonly employed to regulate
business termination, the court pointed to provisions contained in
federal bankruptcy and labor laws, as well as state and local plantclosing ordinances. 1 3 1 Citing the decision in Brooks-Scanlon Co. v.
Railroad Commission, 36 the city argued further that the Supreme Court
had condoned a regulation which specifically required the going concern to continue providing certain commercial services involuntarily.
Nash distinguished the Brooks-Scanlon case on the basis that the holding dealt with the regulation of a public utility as opposed to a private business. 37 The second defense challenged the claim, de facto,
that Nash had been denied the right to exit the landlord business.
At least three alternatives to remaining in the business were available
to landlords, the City proclaimed: (1) decline to re-let vacant apartments, (2) sell, or (3) abandon the property and business. 38 Nash
countered that these alternatives are either of such questionable legality,
or so unattainable or costly, that they do not constitute alternatives
at all.' 39
Since tenants in compliance with the eviction control provisions of
the statute in fact and reality receive a life tenancy in the apartment 4 '
the first alternative is simply illusory. This option would also require
the landlord of a multi-unit facility to prohibitively subsidize the
remaining tenants for an indefinite period in order to keep the premises
open, operating, and maintained."' The second alternative of selling
133. Id. at 23. (discussing fifth amendment impact). See infra notes 155-93 and accompanying
text.
134. Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
135. Appellants' Reply Brief To Amicus Curiae at 20-22, Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
136. Id. at 22.
137. Appellee's Answer To Petition For Hearing at 24-25, Nash v. City of Santa Monica,
37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
138. Appellant's Reply Brief To Amicus Curiae at 17-18, Nash v. City of Santa Monica,
37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
139. Appellee's Answer To Petition For Hearing at 17-19, Nash v. City of Santa Monica,
37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
140. Santa Monica City Charter, Art. XVIII, §1806(a)-(h).
141. An assumption would most likely be made that the Rent Control Board would dispense
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the premises does not exist in the absence of a market in which a
private purchaser would be willing to assume the burdens, obligations and limitations associated with owning and operating controlled
units. Further, absent some due process and just compensation
safeguards, the sale, under coercion, would be constitutionally
suspect. 4' 2 Finally, the city offers no particulars as to how their final
suggested alternative of abandonment can be exercised by the landlord
and avoid the civil and criminal sanctions accompanying the gamut
of modern landlord obligations from code requirements to strict liability
for injury suffered by tenants and third parties on the premises." '
Third, the city argued that the denial of Nash's due process liberty
escaped the requirement for heightened judicial scrutiny because the
due process right in question was only incidentally infringed upon.
Since the statute in question is primarily concerned with the regulation of land use, any concomitant regulation of a personal right is
incidental,' 4 4 and as such, constitutionally permissible." ' Amicus on
behalf of Nash argued that the court was obligated to apply those
authorities utilizing a strict scrutiny standard of review, 46' and argued
for characterizing the impact of the statute as more than incidental
because the right at stake is so fundamental.
The final line of defense used by the city was the position that
even if strict scrutiny of the statute was required in the Nash context,
the statute would meet the standards. Focusing primarily on the demolition control provisions of the rent control law, the city argued, with
supporting data, that such controls play a vital role in combating the
scarcity of affordable rental housing in Santa Monica, and
nationwide. ' Amicus, on behalf of Nash, presented the emerging
with the law's "fair return" requirement (§1805(e)) under these circumstances in light of the
rent increases the Board would have to authorize for the remaining tenants in order to cover
fixed operating expenses of the building.
142. Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement in the U.S. Supreme Court at 9, Nash v. City
of Santa Monica, No. 84-1168.
143. The alternative of abandonment suggested by the city surely does not imply that as
a matter of statutory policy, such actions are to be encouraged in such instances. Most likely
the city would pursue its obligation to enforce the law against the landlord. That such an
argument is seriously advanced to the court, however, is an extension of the general tone and
demeanor toward the rights of the landlord reflected in the Santa Monica rent control statute
itself.
144. Appellant's Reply Brief to Amicus Curiae at 6-7, Nash, supra note 68.
145. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
427 U.S. 59 (1976). Cf Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
146. BriefAmicus Curiaeof Urban Legal Foundation, Inc. In Support of Respondent at 19-22
(citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
147. Appellants' Reply Brief To Amicus Curiae at 36-37, Nash v. City of Santa Monica,
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case law and supporting evidence that controls of this nature in fact
disserve the community with harmful economic and social
side-effects.' 45 The city countered with the assertion that such social
and economic considerations were misplaced as they avoided the legal
merits at issue.' 49 As noted previously, the argument made by the
city regarding this issue pursuaded Chief Justice Bird of the California
Supreme Court that the compelling interest requirement of strict
scrutiny was present, and thereby led to her concurrence in the
decision. ' 0
The contention that the demolition provision of the law also failed
the 'least restrictive means' standard of strict scrutiny also ,proved
troublesome. The Appeals Court, for example, found that the demolition provision did not meet the least restrictive means standard, pointing to features inserted in demolition controls in other jurisdictions
that helped minimize their impact,' 5' and suggested a minimizing
feature of their own which could be incorporated into the statute.5 2
Most local rent control laws do not include demolition controls. Of
those that do, three contain specific exemptions for landlords willing
to go out of business. 5 Not only was the demolition control feature
of the Santa Monica law not the least restrictive, but, as the Appeals
Court suggested, the provision was perhaps the most restrictive possible
on landlord options.' 5 4
B.

A 'Taking' of Property

The trilogy of rent, eviction, and demolition controls, separately
and in combination, also have been subjected to increasing fifth amend-

37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
148. Brief Amicus Curiae Of Urban Legal Foundation, Inc. In Support of Respondent at
22-28, Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
See also, supra notes 15-16, 95-96 and accompanying text.
149. Appellants' Reply To The Amicus Curiae Brief of Urban Legal Foundation, Inc. at
1-7, Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
150. Supra note 72-73 and accompanying text.
151. Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 191 Cal. Rptr. 717, 723-24 (1983).
152. "Santa Monica could make new construction on lots formerly containing rent controlled property subject to rent control." Id. at 724.
153. Brief Amicus Curiae of Urban Legal Foundation, Inc., In Support Of Respondent
at 22, Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 96, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
154. Id., at 21-22; Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 191 Cal. Rptr. 717, 723 (1983). Technically
the Appeals Court ruling was grounded on the due process clause of the California Constitution, as opposed to the federal standard for strict scrutiny. Derivative of the federal model
however, the state standard is essentially identical. Id. Cf. Perez v. City of San Bruno, 27
Cal. 3d. 875, 890 168 Cal. Rptr. 114, 616 P.2d 1287 (1980).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17

ment scrutiny.'5 Utilizing a number of theories, landlords have begun
to assert the claim that the impact of such controls constitutes an
unconstitutional 'taking' of property without just compensation. The
power and cogency of this analysis in a rent control context can be
seen in the reaction to the Nash challenge to the Santa Monica law.
Even though Nash deliberately avoided a 'taking' claim in his initial
action against the Board and the City, fifth amendment analysis was
introduced in the decision of the trial court,' 56 and subsequently became
joined with the substantive due process arguments through two levels
of appeal.' 57
Contemporary constitutional analysis under the taking clause of the
fifth amendment dates from the landmark ruling of the Supreme Court
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'

s

which upheld the con-

stitutionality of a village zoning ordinance. Adopting a quantum departure from previous cases, the Court expanded the common law concept of public nuisance to include the prevention of anticipated future
harm.' 59 In the same stroke the Court shifted the burden from the
government to the individual to establish that the legislative purpose
is not "fairly debatable.""'6 This, in turn, had the effect of creating
a presumption of constitutionality for local land use laws, and reducing subsequent judicial scrutiny solely to the arbitrary nature or
6
unreasonableness of such initiatives.' '
To be reconciled with the traditional governmental eminent domain
powers of compensable takings, is the strong trend toward governmental takings for which no compensation is required. Based on the
law of nuisance, early American jurisprudence recognized the exercise of police powers to abate a public nuisance as appropriate, but
uncompensable. Such takings or regulation did not call for compen155. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In pertinent part: ". . . nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation." Id. Local housing control challenges based on fifth
amendment taking arguments, have been technically instituted under the fourteenth amendment since the fifth amendment has been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. See Chicago, B & 0 R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
156. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
157. Local rent controls have been challenged on other grounds in lower courts, but with
little success. See, e.g., Albigese v. Jersey City, 127 N.J. Super. 101, 316 A. 2d. 483 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (equal protection); Marshall House Inc. v. Rent Review and Grievance
Bd., 357 Mass. 709, 260 N.E. 2d. 200 (1970) (ultra vires action).
158. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
159. Id. at 394-96.
160. Id. at 388.
161. Pulliam, supra note 86, at 464. The latest comprehensive federal study on housing
was critical of the Euclid decision for its "near-abdication of any meaningful judicial review
... " See, The Report of The President's Commission On Housing, supra note 3. at 201.
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sating the owner because the governmental action was brought about
by the owner through the use of the owner's property so as to encroach
on the rights of others.' 6 2 Takings for any non-nuisance purposes,
however, required compensating the owner so that the burden of the
taking could be shifted from the owner to the public for whose benefit
the property was confiscated.' 6 3 Under this enlarged definition of
nuisance articulated in Euclid, the court found no compensable taking despite evidence of a three-fourths reduction in the value of the
64
property of the landowner due to the impact of the ordinance.' The
increasing virulence of local land use regulation in recent years has
created an ever expanding ledger of uncompensable historic preservation, growth control, aesthetic, and environmental public takings at
65
the expense of individual economic and property rights.' Pressure
for the Supreme Court to intervene has been stepped up in light of
recent evidence that the Court may be interested in examining the
taking clause of the fifth amendment as a guarantee "designed to
bar the government from forcing some individuals to bear burdens
which, in all fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole .
With the increasingly intrusive exercise of local police power
"
. . ))166
in the name of land use regulation, the plea for judicial intervention
under the taking clause and other constitutional guarantees will
continue.
Against this orientation of the Supreme Court toward the constitutional conflict between property rights and the police power, the specific
issues raised by the impact of contemporary rent control regimes in
162. For background on the evolution of the taking concept in this country, see generally,
Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 VAsH. L. REV. 553 (1972); Comment,
Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century America, 40 U. CHI.
L. REV. 854, n.l (cited in Pulliam, supra, note 86 at 450).
163. A principle recognized in western legal theory and traceable to Roman law. See Comment, supra note 162, at 854 n.1. (cited in Pullium, supra note 86, at 450.)
164. See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (statute reduced owner's value
by 87.5%).
165. An academic offensive against what is perceived as the growing abuse of police powers
in regulating land use is also in evidence. See Delogu, supra note 86 at 261-65 (representative literature
is noted and referenced).
166. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, joined by three other Justices, argued further, "When one
person is asked to assume more than a fair share of the public burden, the payment of just
compensation operates to redistribute that economic cost from the individual to the public at
large . . . . The payment of just compensation serves to place the landowner in the same
position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken." Id. at
656-57. The Court has since taken other cases in which they could address this issue but which
have eventually been diverted on a technicality. See, e.g., Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank,
(S. Ct. No. 84-4, 1985). See generally, Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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the context of a constitutional 'taking' can be examined. The Court
dealt with an early version of rent and eviction controls imposed during
World War I in Block v. Hirsh.'6 7 Challenged on the grounds that
the law deprived the owners of "the power of profiting from the
sudden influx of people to Washington . . . ," the Court ruled that
"restricting property rights in land to a certain extent without compensation" was justified under the "public exigency" of the wartime
housing scarcity.' 6 8 The emphasis Justice Holmes placed on the fact
that the controls were merely temporary, 69 possibly allows the decision to be read as standing for the unconstitutionality of permanent
restrictions without termination provisions. The permanent restriction
argument can be advanced with regard to both rent and eviction controls. Tenant eviction protections coincidental to rent control impose
severe restrictions on the rental housing owner for an unspecified duration. The recent ruling of the court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 70 seems to have lent impetus to this argument.
In Loretto, the court found as compensable, the installation of cable
television lines in the owner's building, because the action entailed
the "permanent occupation of the landlords' property by a third
party."'"' By anology, the tenant's tenured occupation of the owner's
premises under eviction restrictions creates a similar situation.' 2 The
unconstitutionality of a rent control statute in toto for lack of a specific
termination date, also has been advanced with some success.'"
167. 256 U.S. 135 (1921). In Nash, the California Supreme Court majority solicitously decided
there was no compensable taking under the decisional line established by the United States
Supreme Court in Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 538 U.S. 104 (1978), and
Maher v. City of New Orleans, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). See Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 103-04, Cal.
Rptr. 285, 289, 688 P.2d 894, 898 (1984).
168. Id. at 156.
169. "The regulation is put and justified only as a temporary measure. A limit in time,
to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent
change." Id. at 157 (citations omitted).
170. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Landlord Loretto challenged a New York state law designed to
prevent gouging of cable television companies by limiting the companies' payment to property
owners to no more than one dollar for the installation of television cables on the premises.
Id. at 420. The argument was made successfully that this intrusion constituted a compensable
taking under the fifth amendment. Id. at 439.
171. Id. at 434. The Court excluded permanent intrusions associated with building codes,
mail boxes, etc., a distinction which Justice Blackmun found indistinguishable from the regulation at issue. Id. at 438 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
172. Support for this proposition has been evidenced occasionally in the lower courts. See
Palm Beach Mobile Homes v. Strong, 300 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1974) (striking eviction limitation
for mobile home parks). Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980)
(striking eviction limitation for moorage owners).
173. Business Regulation v. National Manufactured Housing Federation, 370 So. 2d 1132
(Fla. 1979); Rivera v. R. Cobian Cinea & Co., 181 F.2d 974, 974 n.ll (1950). See contra,
Newell v. Rent Board of Peabody, 378 Mass. 443, 392 N.E. 2d 837 (1979).
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The right to exclude is another derivative property right that a
permanent restriction denies the landowner. The Supreme Court has
recently deemed the denial of the right to exclude as a compensable
' In KaiserAetna the right to exclude
taking in KaiserAetna v. U.S. 74
arose in the context of an attempt by the government to impose a
permanent, uncompensated public easement on the property of a
private marina. The subsequent Loretto holding, utilizing the exclusion right of landowners to buttress the decision, injected new life
and force into the concept.' 7 5 By establishing that eviction or demolition controls, or both in combination, encroach on the zone within
which the landlord may otherwise lawfully exclude tenants, the con76
trols are susceptable to a 'taking' challenge.'
From the early applications of the power of eminent domain to
77
acquire milldams and stagecoach roads,' the concept of a physical
intrusion also has been important in fifth amendment takings analysis.
The continuing vitality of this notion is evident in the reliance the
Court placed on the physical infringement on the owner's property
in both Kaiser Aetna'78 and Loretto.' In a rent control context, rent,
eviction, and removal controls, either separately or in combination,
can in effect constitute a permanent physical occupation of property.
This view has found support in the lower courts and appears to have
at least one adherent on the present Supreme Court as well. The Court
recently dismissed an appeal in Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc.
v. Callahan' ° wherein the Massachusetts courts had declined to overturn a refusal of the local Rent Control Board to grant the owner
of an apartment building a permit for removal. In dissent, however,
Justice Rehnquist seemed prepared to find a constitutionally impermissible taking because the impact of the rent control provisions
8'
effected "a physical occupation of the appellants' property."'
Although not technically at issue, the same argument was advanced
in Nash.'I "
174. 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). "[The] 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation." Id.
175. Accord, Judson, supra note 82, at 212.
176. Respondent's Brief at 25-26, Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d. 97, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
177. 2A C. NICHOLS, EMINENT DomsuNs §7.1 at 617 (rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman & P. Rohan 1980).
178. 444 U.S. at 180 ("physical invasion").
179. 458 U.S. at 432 ("physical occupation").
180. 104 S. Ct. 218 (1983).
181. Id.
182. Brief Amicus Curiae of Terminal Plaza Corporation at 16-19, Nash v. City of Santa
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The final taking theory confronting rent control provisions centers

on the right of an owner to property alienation, a principle long protected and encouraged at common law. The involuntary, devaluing
and incapacitating effect of controls on the property of the landowner
also entails an infringement on the owner's ability to transfer and/or
change the use of property.

The latest generation of rent controls exerts such total dominance
over private property interests that the owner and his property become
hostage to the regulation. Restrictions on the discretionary control
of an owner over property, arguably can constitute compensable takings to the extent that the cumulative effect of the controls "impresses

the owner and his property into the mold of a public utility."' 8 3 The
controls operate as a ban on alienation and therefore effect a pro
tanto taking.'84 To the extent that controls effectively deny the landlord
other specific property-related rights, compensable takings also could
be involved. Denial of the landlord's right to evict for personal use,' .
the right to evict in order to rehabilitate the premises,' 86 and the right
to evict and demolish in order to go out of business' 87 or pursue
another use,' 88 are examples that have received some attention in this
category.

The instinctive rebuttal to the ban-on-alienation objection to rent
controls, is that the regulation does not constitute an absolute ban,
and that the owner ultimately retains the option to sell. The ruling
of the Supreme Court in Bowles v. Willingham,' 9 however, can be
read to require that rent control schemes including a specific opt-out
provision for owners in order to escape taking clause applicability.' 9
One of the burdens this rebuttal must bear is the often involuntary
aspect of the transfer of property in a rent control environment.
Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984). Answered in Appellants'
Reply Brief to Atnicus. . . . at 31-34, Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 96, 207
Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984). The difficulty in interpreting the precedential value of
this case was signalled in that the case was cited both as support for Nash in Mosk's dissenting
opinion and support against him in the disposition of the case by the California Supreme Court.
See Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 96, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
183. Id. 207 Cal. Rptr. at 296, 688 P.2d.
184. Mayo v. Boston Rent Control Administrator, 365 Mass. 575, 585-86, 314 N.E. 2d
118, 125 (1974).
185. Rivera, 181 F.2d 978.
186. Mayo, 314 N.E. 2d 125.
187. Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 96, 113, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 296, 688 P.2d 894, 905 (1984).
188. Fresh Pond Shopping Center, 104 S. Ct. 218 (1983).
189. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
190. In upholding the rent control provision of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
the Court noted that the statute provided that the Act shall not be construed "to require any
person to sell any commodity or to offer any accommodations for rent." Id. at 517.
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Whether to avoid the generally onerous impact of controls, or to escape
an entrapment such as Jerome Nash experienced under the Santa
Monica law, the option to sell may well be nonvolitional. For government to force a transfer of property under these circumstances to
a third party is no less a compensable taking than if the government
were to condemn the property and take title itself.' 9' Additionally,
the government's sell option rebuttal can be questioned on the grounds
that it is advanced merely as a device to avoid what would otherwise
comprise an unconstitutional taking through rent control.' 92 As the
Nash litigation suggests, through the impact of rent control laws, the
government can place the landlord in the untenable position of having to surrender one constitutional right to retain the ownership of
property in order to exercise another constitutional right to go out

of business.' 93
C.

The Involuntary Servitude Factor

The increasing restrictiveness of contemporary rent control regimes
and the changing nature of the landlord business in response to the
accumulation of recent tenant legal protections and benefits also have

caused thirteenth amendment concerns. The coercive nature of controls or as they impact the landlord has caused thirteenth amendment

arguments to be joined with the due process and taking theories just
examined. Adding the involuntary aspect of the servitude concept lends

force and further credence to the arguments. Beyond this supporting
role, however, the involuntary servitude provision of the thirteenth
amendment alone has yet to be accepted as a landlord protection in

a rent control context. From its initial, relatively narrow constitutional proscription against involuntary servitude'9 4 in the context of

191. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation In Support of Respondent at 16,
Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984).
192. Midhiff v. Tom, 702 F. 2d 788, 804 (9th Cir. 1983) (cited in Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97,
207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984)).
193. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 142 at 10. "Surely, where a government cannot
directly impose either of two burdens on its citizens, it cannot cure the defects by compelling
its citizens to choose between the two constitutional deprivations." Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 207
Cal. Rptr. 285, 688 P.2d 894 (1984). Justice Mosk characterized Santa Monica's argument
that controls do not constitute a taking because the landlord can always sell, as contending
"that the property owner has a duty to relieve the municipality of its invalid order by dispossessing
himself of his property." Id. at 113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 296, 688 P.2d at 905.
194. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVIII. In pertinent part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States .... ." Id.
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peonage compelling an individual to work in order to pay off a debt,"'
the concept has found surprisingly little applicability in any modern
idiom.' 9 6 The relatively infrequent utilization by the courts of this
guarantee has left an uncertain legacy as to its present-day reach.
As to the impact of rent control provisions on the landlord, the
Supreme Court has only provided a few clues as to the role the
involuntary servitude limitation might play. In Marcus Brown Co.
v. Feldman,'97 the Court construed certain provisions of the World
War I rent controls by noting that "traditions of our law" oppose
compelling one individual to perform strictly personal services for the
benefit of another. But the services provided by the landlord, the Court
opined, "are so far from personal that they constitute the universal
and necessary incidents of modern apartment houses .

. . . '"

Clearly

the Court's latter observation reflects the turn-of-the-century attitude
which prevailed prior to the onset of the tenants' rights revolution.1 99
More recently, the concern expressed by the Court regarding the
necessity of an escape for landowners under the World War II controls in a subsequent ruling of Bowles v. Willingham can be read
as a sensitivity to thirteenth amendment proscriptions.2 "' In particular,
the Court noted the importance of a provision in the statute in question stating that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to0 1 require
''2
any person . . . to offer any accommodation for rent.
Challenging the Santa Monica ordinance, Amicus advanced the argument on behalf of Nash that in denying the landlord the right to
go out of business, the statute stood in violation of the Supreme Court
dictate in Textile Workers Union of America v. DarlingtonManufacturing Co.2"2 This case, commonly read for the recognition of the
right to go out of business entirely within the confines of the National
195. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
196. The opposite is true of the other evil proscribed by the amendment, i.e.,
slavery. See,
e.g., TRIBE, supra, note 128 at 258-61.
197. 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
198. Id. at 199.
199. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
200. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
201. Id. at 517 (emphasis added). In his Nash dissent, Justice Mosk was of the opinion
that this statement placed the Santa Monica controls in conflict with the Bowles decision in
that "the landlord is required to maintain his property as 'accommodations for rent' and to
offer the rentals under the terms ordered by the city. [The landlord] is not permitted to opt
out." Nash, 37 Cal. 3d 97, 113, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 296, 688 P.2d 894, 905 (1984).

202.

380 U.S. 263 (1964) (cited in Amicus Brief of California Housing Council In Support

Of Respondent at 3-4, Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 96, 207 Cal. Rptr 285, 688
P.2d 894).
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Labor Relations Act,20° also carries involuntary servitude overtones.

The applicability of the Darlington principle to the owner of rental
housing subsequently has been endorsed in at least one federal court.2"4

As noted earlier, this principle was pivotal to the dissent's analysis
in the California Supreme Court ruling on the Nash challenge to Santa

Monica rent control provisions.2" 5 Likewise, the unanimous Appeals
Court below seemed prepared to invoke the thirteenth amendment
to protect the "undefined yet real notion of freedom which is violated

by the idea of compelling an individual to work in a given business."206
Thirteenth amendment protection for landlords under these cir-

cumstances would have to be confined to those instances of inextricable
entanglement with the controls. Protection would not extend to
landlords seeking to avoid contractual obligation voluntarily assumed,
duties and liabilities of landlording while accepting the benefits, or
20 7
provisions of the rent control law without constitutional justification.

Thirteenth amendment protection should extend to all other instances
where the controls force landlords to remain in the rental housing

business against their will. The tenant rights movement over the last
fifty years has added a large personal service component to the ren-

tal housing business. Through the device of rent control laws, local
government is conscripting the property and services of the private
sector to provide public housing. Landowners, in need of a mechanism
by which this abuse of police power can be tempered, should not
be dissuaded from probing the involuntary servitude clause of the

thirteenth amendment for help.

203. Justice Harlan for a unanimous court, wrote: "A proposition that a single businessman
cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation
that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent . . . . We find neither." Textile Workers, 380 U.S. at 270.
204. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F. 2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972). While holding
that a landlord could not undertake a partial termination of business by demolishing one unit
to effect a retaliatory eviction, Chief Justice Wright writing for the majority countered that:
"None of this is to say that the landlord may not go out of business entirely if he wishes
to do so, or that the jury is authorized to inspect his motives if he chooses to commit economic
harakiri. There would be severe constitutional problems with a rule of law which required an
entrepreneur to remain in business against his will." Id. at 867.
205. Nash, 37 Cal. 3d at 112, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 295, 688 P.2d at 904 (1984) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
206. Nash, 191 Cal. Rptr. 717, 720 (1983). "This freedom is protected from the most egregious
infringements by the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Yet the degree
to which the individual is restricted need not rise to the level of involuntary servitude before
it offends this notion of personal liberty." Id. at 720.
207. This line of argument is developed in Amicus Brief of California Housing Council
at 6-7 and 13-15.
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CONCLUSION

Today's local rent control initiatives aimed at the problem of a
low-income housing shortage will not be listed among the crowning
achievements of American municipal legislation. Often a product of
majoritarian autocracy and special interest zeal, contemporary rent
control schemes read like the tenant's revenge. The unmistakeable
signature of these enactments is their conspicuous lack of
evenhandedness and restraint.
Crudely drawn and overreaching, modem housing control devices
can intrude deeply into the personal freedom and individual autonomy
of an effected landowner. These provisions, which reap counterproductive economic and social side-effects, continue in force seemingly
uniform as to their impact. The landlord-tenant relationship is gutted
beyond recognition by the statutory delegation of rent and eviction
decisions to a public agency for implementation called for in the typical
state-of-the-art statutes. The end result of a myriad of intrusions into
the operation and markets of the low-income rental housing industry
is to remove the private purpose of profit-seeking from the enterprise
and substitute the public purpose of providing low cost rental housing. In combination, the trilogy of rent, eviction, and demolition
regulation contained in the contemporary rent control regimes involuntarily convert private providers of rental housing into captive public
utilities.
To date, the excesses of local housing controls have found sanctuary under prevailing constitutional analysis. 208 Segments of the fifth,
thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments, however, contain the potential ingredients to assist in curbing this form of police power abuse.
If the courts are to provide a heightened scrutiny of local housing
control initiatives, the analytical vehicle must be found through which
the merits of the accumulating case against such controls can be made.
Continued local legislative autonomy that has nurtured the epidemic
of increasingly restrictive housing control enactments, is merely an
invitation to further mischief.
Proponents of rent controls, however, are now on the defensive.
In defense of aggressive new controls, the courts are urged to cubbyhole landowner complaints by continuing to apply only a minimal
judicial scrutiny. Such controls merely regulate the use of land, the
208. The states of Arizona and Colorado have taken matters into their own hands by
legislatively denying localities the power to enact or enforce rent control ordinances. See THE
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING, supra note 2, at 92.
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rent control proponents argue, and therefore, the effect on the owner
is at best economic and speculative. This anachronism unfortunately
continues to provide an easy way out for those courts so disposed,
but it also obscures the unpleasant realities with which the law must
be realigned.
There are a number of specific problems and policy flaws associated
with rent controls that can no longer be ignored. Various lines of
constitutional analysis, within which these developments might be
addressed by the courts, have remained largely unproductive. Yet,
in exchange for some dubious tenant benefits in the short run, aggressive rent control regimes continue throughout many areas of the
country, and continue to exact an enormous toll on the applicable
housing market, the local economy, the landowner, and ironically the
tenant ultimately. The municipalities themselves can be expected to
continue to fight for the adoption and retention of rent controls
because it is in their institutional interest to do so. Whereas such controls may be intrusive and costly to the economic and social life of
the community, they are terribly convenient to the government. By
transferring the function of providing low cost rental housing to the
private sector, rent control schemes relieve the local government of
establishing its own program and the costs, risks, and potential liability
this would entail. Rent control laws must be recognized for what they
are, i.e., the unwarranted, unenlightened, and injurious application
of governmental authority. The protections and guarantees present
in the constitution should be utilized to curb these excesses.
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